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INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT FROM A TORT LAW
PERSPECTIVE
Charles W. Adams *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. incorporates the doctrine of inducing
infringement from patent law into copyright law.1 By utilizing
the existing doctrine from patent law, the Supreme Court pro-
vided some clarification of the standards for liability for indirect
infringement in copyright law. The Grokster decision also raises
questions, however, about the proof required for inducing in-
fringement with respect to establishing intent and the possibility
of defenses based on the defendant's mental state. For example,
would a defendant be liable for inducing another person to copy
the plaintiffs copyrighted work if the defendant believed (albeit
erroneously) that the other person had a fair use defense to a
claim for copyright infringement? Principles from general tort law
may suggest an answer to this question as well as to other pres-
ently unsettled questions2 involving liability for the indirect in-
fringement of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A., M.A., University of
California at Santa Barbara; J.D., M.B.A., University of California at Berkeley.
I want to thank Tom Arnold, my colleague at the University of Tulsa College of Law,
for directing me to many of the Restatement provisions that are discussed in this article. I
also wish to express gratitude to the participants in the 2006 Intellectual Property Schol-
ars Conference of the University of California (Boalt Hall) School of Law-particularly
Mark Bartholomew, Graeme Dinwoodie, Richard Gruner, Justin Hughes, Tyler Ochoa,
and John Tehranian-for their comments and suggestions on my presentation of this arti-
cle at the conference.
1. See 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
2. Other unsettled questions include: whether a defendant would be liable for induc-
ing a third person to infringe a patent if the defendant believed the patent was invalid;
whether a defendant would be liable for inducing a third person to infringe a trademark if
the defendant believed either that the trademark was invalid or the third person had a
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The law of indirect infringement has developed separately, but
along parallel tracks, in patent, copyright, and trademark law
over the past hundred years. In all three areas, there are circum-
stances. where it is impractical for the owners of intellectual prop-
erty to enforce their rights against direct infringers, and the own-
ers have sought remedies against other persons who they claimed
were responsible for indirect infringement of their intellectual
property rights. The applicable doctrines have varied somewhat
from one field of intellectual property to another, however.' In
patent law, third-party liability has been imposed for contribu-
tory infringement and inducing infringement. Copyright law has
three separate doctrines for third-party liability: vicarious in-
fringement; contributory infringement; and inducing infringe-
ment. Third-party liability in trademark law has been imposed
for inducing infringement and a failure to take reasonable pre-
cautions against infringement. Although liability for the direct in-
fringement of patents, copyrights, or trademarks is imposed on a
strict liability basis,4 liability for indirect infringement has gen-
erally required a showing of the third party's intent, knowledge,
or control with respect to the direct infringement. The particular
requirements for indirect infringement vary between patent,
copyright, and trademark law, and they appear to still be evolv-
ing in the case law.
The law of indirect infringement of patents, copyrights, and
trademarks is derived from common law doctrines of joint liabil-
ity for concerted action, aider and abettor liability, and liability
for permitting or directing the conduct of another.5 These com-
mon law doctrines have evolved to produce an extensive and well-
developed body of tort law that governs a person's liability for
torts committed by another. Since the indirect infringement of a
defense to trademark infringement; whether a seller of a product would be liable for copy-
right or trademark infringement by a third person who used the product to infringe; and
whether an internet service provider would be liable for copyright or trademark infringe-
ment by a user of its network.
3. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The
Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERK-
ELEY TECH. L.J. 1363 (2006) (discussing differences with respect to indirect infringement
in trademark and copyright law).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000) (copy-
rights); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (patents).
5. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 ("[The] doctrines of secondary liability emerged from
common law principles and are well established in the law.").
[Vol. 42:635
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patent, copyright, or trademark is a statutory tort,6 liability for
indirect infringement represents a subset of this more general
body of tort law.7 In general, a person's liability for a tort commit-
ted by another should be dependent upon the person's conduct,
culpability, and relationship to the other person, rather than
whether the tort is a statutory tort, such as the infringement of
intellectual property, or a common law tort, such as trespass or
negligence.
Unfortunately, the law of indirect infringement not only has
become balkanized within intellectual property law between its
constituent areas of patent, copyright, and trademark law, but it
also has diverged from the general body of tort law. Cases and
commentaries within each substantive area of intellectual prop-
erty law have tended to focus on that particular area, and they
generally have not considered the broader legal context in which
the law of indirect infringement operates. One indication of this
tendency is the peculiar specialized terminology of vicarious, con-
tributory, and inducing infringement' used to denote the various
types of indirect infringement. This specialized terminology has
6. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) ("In-
fringement, whether direct or contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies invasion of
some right of the patentee.").
7. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984)
("[V]icarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of con-
tributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the cir-
cumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of an-
other.").
8. "Vicarious" typically refers in tort law to liability imposed for any reason on a per-
son for the torts of another. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LI-
ABILITY § 13 (2000). In contrast, vicarious infringement refers to circumstances where a
person is liable for indirect infringement because the person has the right and ability to
supervise infringing conduct and has a direct financial interest in the infringing conduct.
See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) ("[Elven in the absence of an employer-employee relationship one may be vicariously
liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a di-
rect financial interest in such activities.").
"Contributory" typically refers in tort law to the negligence of a plaintiff that causes
harm to the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965). In contrast, con-
tributory infringement has one meaning in patent law and a different meaning in copy-
right law. In patent law, contributory infringement refers to the sale of a component of a
patented invention if the component is especially made for infringement of the patent and
has no substantial noninfringing use. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (liability of a contributory in-
fringer). In copyright law, contributory infringement refers to a person's inducing, causing,
or contributing to infringing conduct of another with knowledge of the infringing conduct.
See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 ("[Olne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, in-
duces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held
liable as a 'contributory' infringer.").
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probably helped to promote variations in the substantive re-
quirements for indirect infringement between patent, copyright,
and trademark law.
A comparison of general tort law to the law of indirect in-
fringement provides two important benefits. First, the more de-
veloped body of general tort law may shed light on issues in the
law of indirect infringement for which precedent does not yet ex-
ist, which may help to resolve unsettled questions of indirect in-
fringement law. Second, finding differences between general tort
law principles and indirect infringement law may flag aspects of
indirect infringement law that are unsound and need reexamina-
tion.
This article examines the requirements for indirect infringe-
ment in patent, copyright, and trademark law. Section II provides
an overview of general tort law principles governing third-party
liability for torts committed by others. Section III covers indirect
infringement under patent law, where most of the intellectual
property cases involving indirect infringement have arisen. Sec-
tions IV and V address indirect infringement under copyright and
trademark law, respectively. This article concludes that courts
should refer to and consider general tort law principles when ana-
lyzing the indirect infringement of patents, copyrights, and
trademarks. Moreover, the indirect infringement of patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks should conform to general tort law princi-
ples in the absence of persuasive reasons otherwise.
II. LIABILITY FOR TORTS COMMITTED BY OTHERS
There are a variety of grounds for holding a person liable for a
tort committed by another. The grounds that are the most appli-
cable to the indirect infringement of intellectual property rights
are: (1) liability for aiding and abetting torts; (2) liability for in-
ducing torts; (3) liability for permitting use of premises or in-
strumentalities; and (4) liability for employees and independent
contractors. 9
9. Other grounds for a person's liability for another's tort found in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts include: committing a tort in concert with another person; committing a
tort in the course of giving substantial assistance to another person; acting negligently in
employing the other person, (§ 877(b)); failing to exercise care in the control of another
who is likely to do harm; and confiding the performance of a duty to protect a third person
[Vol. 42:635
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A. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Torts
Liability for aiding and abetting the commission of a tort by
another is addressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts section
876(b), which provides: "For harm resulting to a third person
from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if
he ... (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so to conduct himself .... ",, Section 876(b) is concerned
with the defendant's giving of substantial assistance or encour-
agement to the tortfeasor, and it expressly requires the defendant
to know the other person's conduct is tortious. The defendant's
knowledge of the tortious nature of the tortfeasor's conduct is
crucial to the defendant's liability because it provides a basis for
the defendant's culpability. This knowledge requirement there-
fore avoids holding parties liable who are not aware they are un-
wittingly providing substantial assistance to a tortfeasor. The sig-
nificance of the knowledge requirement for aiding and abetting
liability was emphasized by Professor Ruder in the following ex-
ample:
If all that is required in order to impose liability for aiding and abet-
ting is that illegal activity under the securities laws exists and that a
secondary defendant, such as a bank, gave aid to that illegal activity,
the act of loaning funds to the market manipulator would clearly fall
within that category and would expose the bank to liability for aiding
and abetting. Imposition of such liability upon banks would virtually
make them insurers regarding the conduct of insiders to whom they
loan money. If it is assumed that an illegal scheme existed and that
the bank's loan or other activity provided assistance to that scheme,
some remaining distinguishing factor must be found in order to pre-
vent such automatic liability. The bank's knowledge of the illegal
scheme at the time it loaned the money or agreed to loan the money
provides that additional factor. 
11
to another person who fails to perform the duty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
876(a), (c), 877(b), (d)-(e) (1979).
10. Id. § 876(b).
11. David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L.
REV. 597, 630-31 (1972). For a subsequent Supreme Court decision that eliminated pri-
vate civil liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud under the federal securities
statutes, see Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994). See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Civil liability for aiding and abetting
other torts, such as breach of fiduciary duty, continues to be recognized, however. See, e.g.,
Pavlovich v. Nat'l City Bank, 435 F.3d 560, 570 (6thCir. 2006) (Ohio law); In re Sharp Int'l
20081
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While proof of knowledge is essential for aider and abettor liabil-
ity, knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 12
The comment to section 876(b) gives the following rationale for
holding a defendant liable for the tort of another: "Advice or en-
couragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor
and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same
effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical
assistance." 13 The comment also provides that the defendant's as-
sistance or encouragement must be a substantial factor in caus-
ing the tort.14 In addition, the comment states that liability will
be imposed regardless of whether the tortfeasor acts intentionally
or merely negligently, and regardless of whether he knows the
conduct constitutes a tort.15 The comment also explains that to
determine whether the defendant's assistance or encouragement
is substantial enough for the defendant to be liable, the following
factors should be considered: the nature of the act encouraged;
the amount of assistance provided by the defendant; whether the
defendant was present or absent at the time of the tort; the de-
fendant's relation to the tortfeasor; and the defendant's state of
mind. 16
A couple of examples may help illustrate the application of sec-
tion 876(b) to aider and abettor liability. A manufacturer of am-
monium nitrate would not be liable to persons who were injured
when the ammonium nitrate exploded, unless the manufacturer
knew that the purchaser would use the ammonium nitrate as an
explosive. 17 On the other hand, a co-conspirator who supplied
ammonium nitrate to a terrorist with knowledge that the terror-
ist would use the ammonium nitrate as a weapon of mass de-
struction would be liable under section 876(b) as an aider and
Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2005) (New York law).
12. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 519, 535 (6th Cir. 2000)
("For the purposes of establishing aiding and abetting liability, '[tihe requisite intent and
knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence.'" (quoting Metge v. Bachler, 762
F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985))).




17. E.g., Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 618 (10th Cir. 1998)
(manufacturer of ammonium nitrate that was sold as fertilizer but used by Timothy
McVeigh to make a bomb was not liable for negligence or products liability).
[Vol. 42:635
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abettor."i Similarly, a gun manufacturer would not be liable for
injuries caused by its products, ' 9 but a person who supplied a gun
to an accomplice knowing he would use the gun to commit a tort
would be liable under section 876(b) as an aider and abettor.
The application of section 876(b) is also illustrated by Halber-
stam v. Welch.'0 After Welch killed the plaintiffs husband during
a burglary of their home, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action against both Welch and his live-in companion, Hamilton.2'
The trial court entered a judgment for $5.7 million against both
defendants, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia affirmed on the grounds that Hamilton was li-
able both for acting in concert with and for aiding and abetting
Welch. 22 While Hamilton did not participate directly in the bur-
glary or killing, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing that the evidence supported the inference that she acted in
concert with Welch in his burglary enterprise by helping him dis-
pose of stolen property and serving as his banker, bookkeeper,
and secretary over a five year period. 23
The court of appeals also affirmed the ruling that Hamilton
was liable as an aider and abettor, because she provided substan-
tial assistance to Welch knowing that Welch's conduct was tor-
tious. 24 While there was no direct evidence that Hamilton knew of
the killing, the court of appeals decided the trial court's inference
that Hamilton knew Welch was involved in tortious activity was
not clearly erroneous.25 The court of appeals agreed that Hamil-
ton was liable for the killing as an aider and abettor, because the
killing was a natural and foreseeable consequence of Welch's tor-
tious activity.26 In applying the factors from the comment to sec-
18. E.g., United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming con-
viction of Terry Nichols in Oklahoma City bombing case for conspiring to use weapon of
mass destruction and involuntary manslaughter).
19. E.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1059 (N.Y. 2001) (gun
manufacturer did not owe persons killed by handguns a duty of reasonable care in the
marketing and distribution of handguns).
20. See 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
21. Id. at 474.
22. Id. at 474, 489.
23. Id. at 487.
24. Id. at 487-88.
25. Id. at 488.
26. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d, illus. 10 (1979) (co-
conspirator to burglary is liable both for conversion and burning of the house to conceal
the burglary because the burning was a foreseeable consequence of the burglary).
2008]
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tion 876(b) for determining whether Hamilton's assistance was
sufficiently substantial to justify liability, the court of appeals
emphasized Hamilton's state of mind as shown by her long term
participation in the burglary enterprise.27
Section 876(b) would apply to the infringement of patents,
copyrights, or trademarks if a defendant gave substantial assis-
tance or encouragement to a direct infringer, and the defendant
knew the direct infringer's conduct was infringing.
B. Liability for Inducing Torts
Inducing another person's tortious conduct is another basis for
third-party liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(a)
provides for liability for inducing another person to commit a tort:
"For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he (a) orders or induces the
conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that would
make the conduct tortious if it were his own. .". ."" Section 877(a)
overlaps with section 876(b) because in many cases a defendant
may both order or induce another to commit a tort and also give
substantial assistance or encouragement to the tortfeasor. Section
877(a) differs from section 876(b), however, because by requiring
the defendant to order or induce the tortious conduct, section
877(a) implies that the defendant must have a specific intent to
cause the tortfeasor to engage in the tortious conduct.29 In con-
trast, the defendant's state of mind is only one of five factors to be
considered in determining whether the defendant's assistance or
encouragement was sufficient to warrant liability under section
876(b)."0 Another significant difference between sections 877(a)
and 876(b) is that section 876(b) requires the defendant to have
actual knowledge that the tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty,31 while section 877(a) provides for liability if the
defendant's knowledge that the tortfeasor's conduct is tortious is
either actual or constructive.32 Thus, while section 877(a) re-
quires a specific intent to induce tortious conduct, it requires only
27. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (1979).
29. See id.
30. Id. § 876(b) cmt. d.
31. Id. § 876(b).
32. Id. § 877(e).
[Vol. 42:635
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constructive knowledge that the tortfeasor's conduct is tortious.33
The comment to section 877(a) notes that in many situations a
person giving the order or inducement would also be liable as a
principal or master under the law of agency, but section 877(a)
provides an independent ground for liability.34
Section 877(a) would apply to the infringement of patents,
copyrights, or trademarks, if the defendant ordered or induced
the direct infringement, provided that the defendant had actual
or constructive knowledge that the direct infringer's conduct was
infringing.
C. Liability for Permitting Use of Premises or Instrumentalities
An additional basis for liability involves a defendant permitting
a tortfeasor to use the defendant's property to commit torts. Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 877(c) provides: "For harm re-
sulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one
is subject to liability if he ... (c) permits the other to act upon his
premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason
to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously . . . ." The
comment to this provision makes plain that liability is imposed
for a tortfeasor's use of either the defendant's land or chattels
with the defendant's permission.36 While section 877(c) could po-
tentially apply to patent infringement, it more likely would apply
to the infringement of copyrights or trademarks.37
D. Liability for Employees and Independent Contractors
Another source of liability for torts committed by another may
be found in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. An employer is
liable for torts that its employees commit in the course of their
33. See id.
34. Id. § 877 cmt. a.
35. Id. § 877(c).
36. Id. § 877 cmt. d.
37. Generally, a patent infringer will not commit infringing acts on another person's
premises or with another person's instrumentalities. In contrast, a vendor might rent a
stall at a flea market to sell merchandise that infringed copyrights or trademarks, (see,
e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996) (musical re-
cordings); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1145 (7th Cir. 1992) (t-shirts)), or a computer user might use the network of an internet
service provider to infringe a copyright or trademark.
20081
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employment.38 In contrast, the general rule is that an employer is
not liable for torts committed by independent contractors. 39 The
justification for this distinction is that unlike an employer's
power over an employee, an employer's power over an independ-
ent contractor does not extend to controlling the manner in which
the independent contractor works. Therefore, the independent
contractor rather than the employer should bear responsibility for
risks associated with the independent contractor's work.4 Nu-
merous exceptions to the general rule have developed, but they
routinely fall under one of the following categories: where the
harm was due to the employer's negligence in selecting or super-
vising the independent contractor; a non-delegable duty of the
employer was involved; or the work was inherently dangerous.41
None of these appear to be generally applicable to the infringe-
ment of patents, copyrights, or trademarks.42 Accordingly, it
seems that the general rule that an employer is subject to liabil-
ity for the torts of employees, but not of independent contractors,
should apply to the infringement of intellectual property. 1
E. Application of Common Law to Federal Statutory Liability
Patent, copyright, and trademark law are all based on federal
statutes rather than the common law. Nevertheless, the common
law principles described above that govern liability for torts
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) ("A master is subject to
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employ-
ment.").
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) ("Except as stated in [sections]
410-429, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused
to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.").
40. Id. § 409 cmt. b.
41. Id.
42. In particular circumstances, an employer's liability might be predicated on negli-
gence in selecting or supervising an independent contractor, but some sort of duty on the
part of the employer to the injured persons would have to be shown. See, e.g., id. §§ 412
(liability of one who is under duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain land or chattels
is liable for failure to inspect contractor's work), 414 (employer who owes duty to exercise
reasonable care for safety of others is liable if employer entrusts work to contractor for
failure to exercise control). Liability for indirect infringement could not be based on a non-
delegable duty or an inherently dangerous activity, however, because neither would apply
to indirect infringement.
43. An employer might be liable for torts committed by an independent contractor,
though under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(a), if the employer ordered or in-
duced the independent contractor to commit a tort or under other provisions in sections
876 and 877 if the applicable requirements were satisfied.
[Vol. 42:635
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committed by others have application in patent, copyright, and
trademark cases to the extent they are in furtherance of and con-
sistent with congressional intent.
Ever since the Supreme Court declared in the landmark deci-
sion Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that "t]here is no federal gen-
eral common law,"" the authority of federal courts to develop
their own common law has been restricted. For example, in Texas
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that the federal courts had no authority to create a right of
contribution for antitrust cases, even though rights of contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors were found in most states.45 The
Texas Industries Court recognized that Congress could confer au-
thority on the courts to develop substantive law, but it was un-
able to find either an implied right of contribution for antitrust
cases46 or authority for the courts to develop one.
Similarly, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, the Supreme Court refused to impose private civil liabil-
ity for aiding and abetting security fraud under section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.4 The Court noted aid-
ing and abetting was an ancient criminal law doctrine, and Con-
gress had enacted a general aiding and abetting criminal stat-
ute.49 It also noted that Restatement (Second) of Torts section
876(b) had recognized a similar civil liability for aiding and abet-
ting. 5' Nevertheless, the Court decided that there was no general
civil liability for aiding and abetting because Congress had not
enacted such a general statute, but instead had taken a statute-
by-statute approach to civil aiding and abetting liability.5 ' After
analyzing the text and background of section 10(b), the Court de-
cided there was no express or implicit congressional intent to im-
pose civil liability for aiding and abetting under the securities
laws. 52
44. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
45. 451 U.S. 630, 634, 646 (1981).
46. Id. at 639-40.
47. Id. at 642-45.
48. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
49. Id. at 181.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 182.
52. Id. at 183-85. In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress
considered, but ultimately decided against, overturning the Central Bank decision. Con-
20081
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The Courts of Appeal for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits both
relied on Central Bank in declining to impose aider and abettor
liability under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act be-
cause there was no express or implied congressional intent to cre-
ate secondary liability for aiders and abettors.53 In contrast, in
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land Foundation for
Relief and Development, the Seventh Circuit imposed secondary
liability for aiding and abetting under an international terrorism
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which authorizes suits for acts of inter-
national terrorism and provides for the recovery of treble dam-
ages. 4 In Boim, an American was murdered in Israel by members
of Hamas, which was designated a foreign terrorist organization
by Executive Order in 1995."5 The victim's parents sued not only
their son's killers, but also two nonprofit organizations based in
the United States that the parents claimed provided material
support to Hamas.56 Distinguishing Central Bank on the grounds
that it addressed aiding and abetting liability under a particular
securities statute rather than under all federal statutes, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded "aiding and abetting liability is both ap-
propriate and called for by the language, structure, and legisla-
tive history of § 2333." 57
The Supreme Court has opined that Congress legislates
against a background of traditional common law rules, and there-
fore federal legislation generally incorporates those rules. This
principle is exemplified by Meyer v. Holley, where the Court
unanimously held that the Fair Housing Act imposes vicarious li-
ability without fault on an employer for the unlawful activities of
employees in accordance with traditional agency principles. " The
Holleys were an interracial couple who alleged a real estate
salesman prevented them from buying a house for racially dis-
gress did, however, grant the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to bring ac-
tions for injunctive relief and money damages against aiders and abettors. S. REP. No.
104-98, at 19 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 698; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)
(2000) (authorizing SEC action against any person who knowingly provides substantial
assistance to security law violations); Howard v. SEC, 376 F.3d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (SEC action against aider and abettor).
53. See Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); Doe v. GTE
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2003).
54. 291 F.3d 1000, 1001, 1028 (7th Cir. 2002).
55. Id. at 1002.
56. Id. at 1003-04.
57. Id. at 1018-21.
58. 537 U.S. 280, 282 (2003).
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criminatory reasons.59 They brought an action under the Fair
Housing Act against both the salesman and Meyer, the president
and sole shareholder of the real estate firm." The trial court dis-
missed the action against Meyer on the grounds that vicarious li-
ability did not extend to officers and shareholders of corporate
employers.6 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Fair
Housing Act imposed more extensive vicarious liability based on
the officer's right to control the actions of the employee.6 2 The Su-
preme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, however, and
noted that "when Congress creates a tort action, it legislates
against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious li-
ability rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorpo-
rate those rules."63 The Court concluded that under traditional
agency principles, vicarious liability for the acts of an employee
extended only to the corporate employer and not to the officers or
shareholders of the corporation.64 In the absence of an expression
of a contrary intent, it was appropriate to infer that Congress in-
tended this traditional rule to apply. 65
The justification for applying general common law principles
concerning liability for torts committed by others is especially
compelling with respect to patent law because 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
and (c), the provisions in the patent statute governing contribu-
tory infringement and inducing infringement, were enacted for
the purpose of codifying the common law.66 The Senate Report ac-
companying the statute explained:
Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) relate to the subject referred to as con-
tributory infringement. The doctrine of contributory infringement
has been part of our law for about 80 years .... Considerable doubt
and confusion as to the scope of contributory infringement has re-
sulted from a number of decisions of the courts in recent years. The
purpose of this section is to codify in statutory form principles of con-
tributory infringement and at the same time eliminate this doubt
and confusion.
59. Id. at 282-83.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 283.
62. Id. at 284.
63. Id. at 285 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 709 (1999)).
64. Id. at 286-87.
65. Id.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 73-106 (discussing further the common law
development of the doctrine of contributory infringement and its codification in § 271).
67. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 8 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402.
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Given this express statement to codify the common law, there
is no need to find an implied intent or authorization for federal
courts to apply general tort principles to contributory infringe-
ment and inducing infringement in patent law. Of course, the
patent statute would control to the extent that it differs from the
common law, but in the absence of any contrary congressional in-
tent, the common law should be used to construe the patent stat-
ute because the Senate Report expressed the intent to codify the
common law.
There is also considerable support for applying general com-
mon law principles concerning liability for torts committed by
others to copyright law. In contrast to patent law, there is no ex-
press provision for indirect liability in the copyright statute.
There are references to the liability of both contributory and vi-
carious infringers of copyrights, however, in the legislative his-
tory of the Copyright Act of 1976. The House Report addresses
contributory infringement as follows:
The exclusive rights accorded to a copyright owner under section 106
are "to do and to authorize" any of the activities specified in the five
numbered clauses. Use of the phrase "to authorize" is intended to
avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers. For
example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a mo-
tion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the busi-
ness of renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public per-
formance. 
68
The House Report also expresses the intent not to alter the ex-
isting law regarding vicarious liability for infringing perform-
ances:
The committee has considered and rejected an amendment to this
section intended to exempt the proprietors of an establishment, such
as a ballroom or night club, from liability for copyright infringement
committed by an independent contractor, such as an orchestra
leader. A well-established principle of copyright law is that a person
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an
infringer, including persons who can be considered related or vicari-
ous infringers. To be held a related or vicarious infringer in the case
of performing rights, a defendant must either actively operate or su-
pervise the operation of the place wherein the performances occur, or
control the content of the infringing program, and expect commercial
gain from the operation and either direct or indirect benefit from the
infringing performance. The committee has decided that no justifica-
68. H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
[Vol. 42:635
INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT
tion exists for changing existing law, and causing a significant ero-
sion of the public performance right. 
69
The Supreme Court also has recognized the relationship of in-
direct liability for copyright infringement to the common law. In
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Court
stated: "Although '[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render
anyone liable for infringement committed by another,' these doc-
trines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles
and are well established in the law."7 °
Similarly, while the federal trademark statutes do not ex-
pressly recognize indirect liability for trademark infringement,
the Supreme Court has done so in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc.:
[L]iability for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who
actually mislabel goods with the mark of another. Even if a manufac-
turer does not directly control others in the chain of distribution, it
can be held responsible for their infringing activities under certain
circumstances. Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally
induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply
its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging
in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is con-
tributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the de-
ceit.
7 1
The patent statutes, the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright
Act, and the Grokster and Inwood decisions provide solid support
for the recognition of indirect liability for the infringement of pat-
ents, copyrights, and trademarks. Under Meyer, the indirect li-
ability should be governed by the general common law principles
concerning liability for torts committed by others in the absence
of express or implied congressional intent to the contrary.
This section has surveyed the general law of torts relating to
the circumstances when a defendant may be liable for torts com-
mitted by others, and its applicability to indirect liability for the
infringement of patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The remain-
ing sections will examine the law of indirect infringement of intel-
lectual property and compare it to the general law of torts de-
scribed in this section.
69. Id. at 159-60, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5775-76.
70. 545 U.S. 913, 930-31 (2005) (citation omitted).
71. 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).
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III. INDIRECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT
A claim for the indirect infringement of a patent typically
arises in the context of the sale of a product that does not itself
infringe, but which may be used by the purchaser to infringe the
patent. In many cases, the product is a component of a patented
device that consists of a combination of elements, and the patent
will not be infringed unless the product satisfies all the elements
of the patented combination. While the manufacture or sale of the
component is not infringing by itself, the component is susceptible
to the purchaser's combining it with other components, thereby
infringing the patent for the combination. Other cases may in-
volve a patented process and the sale of a product that is suscep-
tible to being used to infringe the patent for the process, but the
product does not infringe unless it is actually used to do so. If
there are a large number of purchasers and only one seller, it
may not be feasible for the patentee to bring multiple actions
against the purchasers, but it may be feasible to bring a single
patent infringement action against the seller.
Indirect infringement in patent law originated in 1871 with the
case of Wallace v. Holmes.72 The patent was for a lamp consisting
of a burner and a glass chimney attached to the burner. 73 The de-
fendants manufactured and sold burners that were substantially
the same as the burners described in the patent, but the defen-
dants did not directly infringe the patent because they did not sell
chimneys with the burners. Instead, the purchasers of the burn-
ers directly infringed the patent when they attached to the defen-
dants' burners chimneys they had purchased separately. 4 Never-
theless, the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut held that
the defendants were liable for patent infringement because the
defendants acted in actual concert with the makers of the glass
chimneys to cause the patent to be infringed. 75 The court noted
that a burner and chimney were "each utterly useless without the
other."76 While there was no direct evidence that the defendants
acted in actual concert with the makers of the glass chimneys to
infringe the patent, the court concluded that their actual concert
72. See 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
73. Id. at 79.





followed from a "certain inference from the nature of the case,
and the distinct efforts of the defendants to bring the burner in
question into use, which can only be done by adding the chim-
ney."77 The court explained that even though the defendants may
not have had an actual pre-arrangement with any particular per-
son to supply the chimney to be added to the burner, each sale of
a burner was a proposal to the purchaser to combine it with a
chimney and the purchase was consent to the proposal.78 Thus,
the defendants' manufacture and sale of the burners made them
active parties to the infringement.
The court in Wallace relied on the defendants' acting in concert
as the basis for liability for indirect patent infringement, and
therefore it would fit within the rule in Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 876(a).79 Only a few years after Wallace, an addi-
tional basis for indirect patent infringement began to develop in
the courts. In the 1878 case of Bowker v. Dows, the patent was for
a fountain drink containing an extract called saponine that in-
creased the foam in the drink s.8  The defendant sold a saponine
extract to buyers who intended to combine it with the other in-
gredients to make the patented fountain drink." The Circuit
Court for the District of Massachusetts observed that the defen-
dant's manufacture and sale of the saponine extract alone would
not be sufficient for indirect infringement.8 2 Nevertheless, the
court imposed liability for indirect infringement because it found
that the defendant had advertised and sold the saponine extract
for the purpose of inducing the purchasers to use it to infringe the
patent. s3 The court explained:
The defendant sells an extract containing saponine to persons who
intend to use it in the combination claimed in the patent, and it is
advertised and sold for that very purpose, Such a sale we regard as
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Section 876(a) provides: "For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the
other or pursuant to a common design with him .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
876(a) (1979). The comment to section 876(a) explains that parties act in concert "when
they act in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to
accomplish a particular result," and that the early common law based their liability on a
mutual agency between them. Id. § 876 cmt. a.
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an infringement of the patent, though the manufacture and sale of
the extract of saponine would not, without more, be an infringement.
Where the patent was for a combination of the burner and chimney
of a lamp, and the defendant made and sold the burner intending
that it should be used with the chimney, he was held by Judge
Woodruff to be liable as an infringer. Wallace v. Holmes [Case No.
17,100]. We do not think that the law requires us to hold those per-
sons who actually use the combination (most of them, and perhaps
all, without any purpose or knowledge of infringing), as the only per-
sons liable, to the exoneration of the only person who makes and
sells the extract for the express and avowed purpose of its use in the
combination. 84
While the Bowker Court relied on Wallace, Bowker is analyti-
cally distinct from Wallace. Liability in Wallace arose from the
absence of any non-infringing uses for the burners that the de-
fendants manufactured and sold, and it was based on the defen-
dants acting in concert with the purchasers to infringe the pat-
ent. 5 In contrast, the saponine extract in Bowker presumably
had other uses (such as increasing foam in other fountain drinks)
besides infringement of the patent; otherwise, the defendant's
manufacture and sale of it would have been sufficient to impose
liability. 6 Thus, liability in Bowker arose not merely from the de-
fendant's manufacture and sale of the saponine extract, but from
the defendant's advertising and selling the extract for the pur-
pose of inducing the purchasers to infringe the patent.8 7 Referring
to the general tort law principles discussed above, the saponine
manufacturer in Bowker would be liable as an aider or abettor
under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b), provided
there was evidence that the manufacturer had actual knowledge
of the patent and that the buyers were infringing it, because it
provided substantial assistance to the direct infringers by supply-
ing them with saponine. Alternatively, the saponine manufac-
turer in Bowker would be liable for inducing infringement under
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(a) through its advertis-
ing if it knew or should have known that the buyers would use
the saponine to infringe the patent.
Although the categories of indirect infringement in Wallace
and Bowker are analytically distinct, subsequent cases consoli-
84. Id.
85. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).




dated them under the single heading of contributory infringement
with liability based on the defendant's intent to assist another to
infringe. For example, the Supreme Court approved the following
statement in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.: "'Contributory infringement
... has been well defined as the intentional aiding of one person
by another in the unlawful making or selling or using of the pat-
ented invention."'' 8 A defendant's intent to assist another to in-
fringe could be inferred either from the absence of noninfringing
uses for a product that the defendant sold 9 or from evidence that
the defendant induced purchasers of the product to infringe
through advertising or other means.' °
This consolidated version of contributory infringement is simi-
lar to the liability for aiding and abetting in Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 876(b), where a defendant substantially assists or
encourages another's tortious conduct.91 Section 876(b) differs
from the consolidated version of contributory infringement, how-
ever, in that section 876(b) expressly requires the defendant to
have actual knowledge that the other person's conduct is tortious,
while the consolidated version of contributory infringement re-
quired the defendant to intentionally aid the other person in in-
fringing the patent.
The development of the doctrine of contributory infringement
had the beneficial effect of providing redress to patentees against
aiders and abettors of patent infringement.92 It also led to abuse,
88. 224 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1912) (quoting Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry.
Specialty Co., 72 F. 1016, 1017 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896)).
89. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723-24 (6th Cir. 1897)
("But, where the article can only be used in a patented combination, the inference of the
intention of the maker and seller is certain . . . ."); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005) ("In sum, where an article is 'good for noth-
ing else' but infringement ... there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed avail-
ability, and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe."(citations
omitted)).
90. See Cugley v. Bundy Incubator Co., 93 F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 1937) (concerning
sale of product with instructions to infringe patented method); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir. 1926) (dealing with advertising that
product was designed for infringing use and directions on cartons in which products were
sold had instructions for infringing use).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) ("For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he ... (b) knows
that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself ... ").
92. See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringe-
ment, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 370 (2006).
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however, as some patentees sought to extend their patent rights
beyond the legitimate scope of their patents to cover supplies and
other staple materials that were used in their inventions.93 The
first means they used were tying arrangements with purchasers
of their products in which the patentees licensed their inventions
in return for agreements that the purchasers would purchase
supplies for the inventions exclusively from the patentees. 94 In-
stead of enforcing the tying arrangements directly against the
purchasers, patentees often relied on the doctrine of contributory
infringement to enforce the tying arrangements against compa-
nies that provided supplies and other staple materials the pur-
chasers used to infringe the patents. 95 Congress responded to this
abuse with the Clayton Act, which prohibited tying arrange-
ments. 96
Even after the Clayton Act, patentees attempted to use the doc-
trine of contributory infringement against manufacturers of sup-
plies that were used in their patented inventions. For example, in
Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp.,
the plaintiff was a dry ice manufacturer that had a patent on a
device that used dry ice, and the plaintiff attempted to leverage
its patent by asserting a claim for contributory infringement
against a competing manufacturer of dry ice.97 The Supreme
Court might have rejected the contributory infringement claim on
the grounds that the purchasers of the plaintiffs device did not
directly infringe the patent by purchasing dry ice from the plain-
tiffs competitors because the patent did not give the plaintiff the
exclusive right to sell dry ice to purchasers of its device.98 In-
stead, the Court created the doctrine of patent misuse to prevent
patentees from enlarging their exclusive rights beyond the le-
gitimate scope of their patents.99 In a series of decisions, the
Court rapidly expanded the doctrine of patent misuse until it fi-
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1912).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000).
97. 283 U.S. 27, 29-30 (1931).
98. Cf Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425,
432-33 (1894) (holding patent for toilet paper holder was not infringed by the defendants'
purchase of toilet paper used in the patented toilet paper holder).
99. See Carbice, 283 U.S. at 33-34; Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of
the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 526 (1953) (noting that the doctrine of
patent misuse was first pronounced in the Carbice case).
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nally appeared to override the doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment.' 0 The patent bar reacted to these decisions in 1952 by ap-
proaching Congress about securing the adoption of 35 U.S.C. §
271.101
Section 271 codifies both the doctrines of contributory in-
fringement and patent misuse so they no longer conflict with each
other. It also subdivides the consolidated version of contributory
infringement into two categories of indirect infringement. Section
271(b) imposes liability on "[whoever actively induces infringe-
ment of a patent,"" 2 and it covers the circumstances in the
Bowker case where the defendant advertised and sold its product
for the express purpose that purchasers of the product would use
the product to infringe a patent. Section 271(c) imposes liability
on the seller of "a component of a patented machine, manufac-
ture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for
use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part
of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or espe-
cially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent."'1 3 Sec-
tion 271(c) excludes from its scope the sale of "a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use."'0 4 Thus, § 271(c) would cover the sale of the patented device
in the Carbice case, but not the sale of dry ice, which would be ex-
cluded because it is a "staple article or commodity of commerce,"
rather than a material part of the patented invention.' 5 By ex-
cluding the sale of staple articles from the scope of contributory
infringement, § 271(c) avoids the abuses of the doctrine of con-
tributory infringement that led to the development of the doctrine
of patent misuse. Finally, § 271(d) limits the scope of patent mis-
use by excluding circumstances where liability is imposed under
paragraphs (b) or (c). '06
100. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666-69 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944); Rich, supra note
99, at 535-36 (describing the doctrine of contributory infringement as "completely sub-
merged" by the doctrine of patent misuse and "entirely dead as a basis of recovery").
101. For additional discussion of the historical background of contributory infringe-
ment and the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271, see generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS § 17.02 [1]-[6] (2004); Adams, supra note 92; Rich, supra note 99.
102. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
103. Id. § 271(c).
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. § 271(d).
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Section 271(b) is analogous to the provision for inducing in-
fringement in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(a), and §
271(c) is analogous to the provision for aider and abettor li-
ability in section 876(b). Restatement (Second) of Torts section
876(b) differs from § 271(c), however, in that it provides for li-
ability if the aider and abettor "gives substantial assistance or
encouragement" to the person committing the tort, while § 271(c)
requires the sale of a component that is especially made or
adapted for use in infringement of a patent, and excludes the sale
of a staple article that is suitable for substantial noninfringing
use. 107
It is difficult to conceive of a circumstance where the sale of a
component with no substantial noninfringing use would not sub-
stantially assist an infringer; therefore, selling a component with
no substantial use other than for infringement would almost al-
ways constitute "substantial assistance" to an infringer. On the
other hand, an aider and abettor might give substantial assis-
tance to an infringer by providing a staple article because the
staple article may be of substantial assistance for infringement,
even though it also has substantial noninfringing uses. Therefore,
the standard for contributory infringement under § 271(c) ap-
pears narrower than the standard for aider and abettor liability
under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b). Would it be
possible to hold a defendant liable as an aider and abettor under
section 876(b) for selling a staple article if there was proof the de-
fendant had actual knowledge that the buyer was using the sta-
ple article to infringe a patent? It would seem the history behind
the enactment of § 271 would preclude such a result. The Senate
Report accompanying § 271 stated:
Considerable doubt and confusion as to the scope of contributory in-
fringement has resulted from a number of decisions of the courts in
recent years. The purpose of this section is to codify in statutory form
principles of contributory infringement and at the same time elimi-
nate this doubt and confusion .... [Section 271(c)] is much more re-
stricted than many oroponents of contributory infringement believe
should be the case.
It would be contrary to this legislative intent to extend liability
for contributory infringement beyond the scope of § 271(c) to cover
sales of products with substantial noninfringing uses.
107. Compare id. § 271(c), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
108. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 8 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402.
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The Supreme Court addressed the mental state required for
contributory infringement under § 271(c) in Aro Manufacturing
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co."°9 Aro involved a patent
for automobile convertible tops, and it arose out of the defen-
dant's sale of replacements for fabric portions of worn-out con-
vertible tops to automobile owners. ° The automobile owners
were liable for direct infringement because the automobile manu-
facturer (Ford) had not obtained a license from the patentee for
the convertible tops."' By a 5-4 majority, the Court held that the
defendant's liability for contributory infringement under § 271(c)
depended on the defendant's knowledge not only that the fabric
replacements were "especially made or especially adapted for use"
in the convertible tops, but also that the use in the convertible
tops would be infringing.11 2 The Court held that in order for the
defendant's sales to constitute contributory infringement the de-
fendant not only must have been aware of the patent but it also
must have known that the automobile manufacturer was not li-
censed under the patent at the time the defendant sold the fabric
replacements to the automobile owners." 3 This result is consis-
tent with Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b), which re-
quires both that a defendant gives substantial assistance or en-
couragement to another person and that the defendant knows the
other person's conduct constitutes a breach of duty in order for
the defendant to be liable for harm to a third person resulting
from the other person's conduct.
1 4
While a defendant's knowledge of infringement is required for
liability for contributory infringement under § 271(c), there is no
requirement of an intent to cause infringement under this provi-
sion.15 In contrast, there is an intent requirement for inducing
infringement under § 271(b)." 6
109. See 377 U.S. 476, 481 (1964).
110. Id. at 478-79.
111. Id. at 484.
112. Id. at 488 ("[A] majority of the Court is of the view that § 271(c) does require a
showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for which his
component was especially designed was both patented and infringing.").
113. Id. at 491.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
115. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("Section 271(c) ... made clear that only proof of a defendant's knowledge, not
intent, that his activity cause infringement was necessary to establish contributory in-
fringement."); Rich, supra note 99, at 538-39 ("[Section 271(c)] gives rise to liability with-
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently analyzed
the intent requirement for inducing infringement under § 271(b)
in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. Ld. 117 The plaintiffs in DSU
Medical were the owner and the exclusive licensee of a patent for
a guard for medical needles that protected users from accidental
needle-stick injuries.11 The defendants were the Australian
manufacturer of another needle guard (which was called a Platy-
pus after the distinctive mammal from Australia, probably be-
cause the guard resembled the duck bill of a platypus when used)
and a Japanese medical supply business that sold the Platypus
needle guards in the United States.'19
The defendants' Platypus needle guard was a stand-alone prod-
uct that required no attachment to a needle assembly before
use.12 ° The Australian manufacturer sold them to the Japanese
medical supply business in an open-shell configuration, and the
Japanese medical supply business generally closed the Platypus
guards around needle assemblies in Malaysia before distributing
them in the United States. 121 The claims in the patent required
the guard to enclose either a needle assembly or a slot for receiv-
ing a needle assembly.122 Consequently, the Platypus guards
could only infringe the patent when they were in a closed-shell
configuration. 23 The jury returned a verdict finding that the
Japanese medical supply business directly infringed the patent,
but that the Australian manufacturer did not either contributo-
rily infringe or induce infringement.'24 With respect to contribu-
tory infringement, the Federal Circuit decided, although the
Platypus needle guards had no substantial non-infringing uses
and the Australian manufacturer had knowledge of the patent,
there was no contributory infringement for the Australian manu-
facturer's sales to the Japanese medical supply business because
out any further proof of intent or inducement or joint action with the direct infringer.").
116. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469.
117. See 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 1297-98.
119. Id. at 1298-99.
120. Id. at 1298.
121. Id. at 1299. The Australian manufacturer also shipped a smaller number of Platy-
pus guards to the United States, but all of them were shipped in the open-shell configura-
tion. Id. at 1302.
122. Id. at 1300.
123. See id. at 1301-02.
124. Id. at 1302.
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the sales did not occur in the United States, as § 271(c) expressly
requires. 1
25
The court then turned to the Australian manufacturer's liabil-
ity for inducing infringement under § 271(b). While most of the
opinion was based on a decision by a three-judge panel, the entire
Federal Circuit decided the issue addressing the intent required
for inducing infringement in order to resolve conflicting prece-
dent. 126 The conflict was between two Federal Circuit decisions
from 1990-Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc. 12' and
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc. 128
In Hewlett-Packard, the patentee asserted claims for direct in-
fringement and inducing infringement against Bausch & Lomb,
which owned the division that was sold while the alleged in-
fringement was occurring. 129 The patentee asserted the claim for
direct infringement against Bausch & Lomb for the period before
the sale and the claim for inducing infringement against the pur-
chaser for the period after the sale. 3 ° With respect to the direct
infringement, Bausch & Lomb admitted infringement but raised
the defense of patent invalidity and it denied liability for inducing
infringement. 131 The trial court decided Bausch & Lomb was li-
able for direct infringement before the sale, but not liable for in-
ducing infringement after the sale, and the Federal Circuit af-
firmed. 13
2
The Hewlett-Packard Court held that "proof of actual intent to
cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary
125. Id. at 1303-04; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) ("Whoever offers to sell or sells within the
United States . . .a component of a patented machine ... knowing the same to be espe-
cially made ... for use in an infringement of such patent... shall be liable as a contribu-
tory infringer." (emphasis added)). The Federal Circuit ruled that there was also no con-
tributory infringement shown with respect to the products that the Australian
manufacturer had shipped to the United States because there was no evidence of direct
infringement. DSU Medical Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304. The products the Australian manu-
facturer had shipped to the United States were sold in an open-shell configuration, and
there was no evidence offered that those products had ever actually been closed. Id. In or-
der for the products to directly have infringed the patent, it was necessary for them to
have been closed. Id. at 1303.
126. DSU Medical Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304.
127. 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
128. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
129. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1467.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1467, 1470.
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prerequisite to finding active inducement." '133 The court concluded
Bausch & Lomb was not liable for inducing infringement because
there was no proof of this intent.13 Focusing on the Bausch &
Lomb's motives, the court decided the company was merely inter-
ested in selling the division for the highest possible price, and did
not care whether or not the division continued to infringe the pat-
ent after the sale. 135 Because the court ruled that Bausch & Lomb
did not intend to induce the acts that constituted the infringe-
ment, it did not need to address whether there were additional
reasons Bausch & Lomb was not liable for inducing infringement.
Had the court done so, it might have decided Bausch & Lomb also
was not liable for inducing infringement because it believed the
patent was invalid, as the company had asserted in defending
against the direct infringement claim.
Manville involved the personal liability of corporate officers for
patent infringement by the corporation based on their inducing
infringement by the corporation.'36 In reversing a judgment with
respect to the officers' liability for inducing infringement, the
Federal Circuit held: "The plaintiff has the burden of showing
that the alleged infringer's actions induced infringing acts and
that he knew or should have known his actions would induce ac-
tual infringements."'37 The court decided that the corporate offi-
cers were not liable for inducing patent infringement by the cor-
poration because there was no basis for concluding they knew or
should have known their actions would induce actual infringe-
ments. 138 The officers had no way of knowing their actions would
induce infringement before the suit was filed because they were
not aware of the patent until after the suit was filed, and they
were not liable for inducing patent infringement after the suit
was filed because of their good faith belief, based on advice of
counsel, that the accused corporation's product did not infringe. 139
The difference between the standards in Hewlett-Packard and
Manville is the second part of the Manville standard-that the
133. Id. at 1469.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
137. Id. at 553.
138. Id. at 553-54.
139. Id. at 553.
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defendant knew or should have known the defendant's actions
would induce actual infringements.14 ° The standards in Hewlett-
Packard and Manville are not really inconsistent, however, be-
cause the Hewlett-Packard court did not purport to rule that the
intent to induce the acts that constituted infringement was suffi-
cient for inducing infringement.1 ' Instead, the Hewlett-Packard
court held this intent was only "a necessary prerequisite" to in-
ducing infringement.'42
In DSU Medical Corp., the plaintiff argued the trial court erred
by instructing the jury, in accordance with Manville, that the de-
fendant must have both caused the acts that constituted direct in-
fringement and known or should have known that the acts would
cause the direct infringement. 4 ' Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. '44
concerning inducing infringement of a copyright, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that "the intent requirement for inducement requires
more than just intent to cause the acts that produce direct in-
fringement. Beyond that threshold knowledge, the inducer must
have an affirmative intent to cause direct infringement."'45 Ac-
cordingly, the appellate court ruled that the trial court had cor-
rectly instructed the jury, and it affirmed the judgment.'4
In summary, the mental state required for inducing infringe-
ment under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is a specific intent by the defen-
dant to induce the direct infringer's acts that constitute infringe-
ment and in addition, that the defendant knew or should have
known the direct infringer's acts would be infringing. These re-
quirements are substantially the same as those found in Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 877(a) for tort liability for inducing
another's tortious conduct that results in harm to a third per-
140. Id.
141. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
142. Id. ("[Proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is
a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement."). Judges Michel and Mayer filed a
concurring opinion in which they stated it was not necessary for the Federal Circuit en
banc to address the intent requirement for inducing infringement because there was no
actual conflict between Hewlett-Packard and Manville. DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.,
471 F.3d 1293, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michael, C.J., & Mayer, J., concurring).
143. DSU Medical Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304-05.
144. 545 U.S. 913 (2005); see infra text accompanying notes 197-204.
145. DSU Medical Corp., 471 F.3d at 1306.
146. Id. at 1297, 1306.
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son. 147 In contrast, the mental state required for liability for con-
tributory infringement under § 271(c) is the defendant's knowl-
edge that "the combination for which his component was espe-
cially designed was both patented and infringing."
14
The next section examines the mental states required for indi-
rect liability for copyright infringement and compares them to the
general tort standards for indirect liability.
IV. INDIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The contexts in which claims for indirect copyright infringe-
ment arise differ from the contexts for indirect patent infringe-
ment. Typically, indirect patent infringement claims arise out of
the sale of a product component used by a purchaser to infringe a
patent for the product, or the sale of a product used by a pur-
chaser to infringe a patented method. 149 In contrast, indirect
copyright infringement claims mostly arise in two other contexts.
In the first context, the defendant has control of premises
where copyright infringement is occurring and receives financial
benefit from the copyright infringement. Liability is imposed un-
der the heading of vicarious copyright infringement, and it is
based on an extension of the agency principle of respondeat supe-
rior. 150 In the second context, the defendant either materially con-
tributes to or induces copyright infringement by another person
and the defendant knows of the infringement. Liability is im-
posed under the heading of contributory copyright infringement,
and the standard for it is similar to that set out in Restatement
(Second) of Torts sections 876(b) 1 and 877(a)." 2
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (1979).
148. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964).
149. For other contexts in which indirect patent infringement claims have arisen, see
supra text accompanying notes 129-39.
150. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996)
("The concept of vicarious copyright liability was developed in the Second Circuit as an
outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior.").
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) ("For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he.... (b) knows
that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself. . .).
152. Id. § 877(a) ("For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of an-
other, one is subject to liability if he (a) orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or
should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his
[Vol. 42:635
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The doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement developed out
of a series of cases in which dance hall proprietors were held li-
able for copyright infringement by orchestras that were perform-
ing at the dance halls. In one instance, liability was imposed on
the dance hall proprietors even though the orchestras were inde-
pendent contractors rather than employees. 1 3 In another case,
the court imposed liability even though proprietors did not par-
ticipate in the selection of the infringing music. 154 In other cases,
liability attached even when the proprietors neither intended to
infringe nor knew of the copyright infringement by the orches-
tras. 1" Summarizing these cases, the Second Circuit concluded in
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co. that liability for vi-
carious copyright infringement could be predicated on the defen-
dant's right and ability to supervise the infringing activity when
combined with the defendant's direct financial interest in the ex-
ploitation of the copyrighted materials.'56 The policy behind im-
posing liability on the defendant when these conditions were sat-
isfied was to encourage the defendant to police the conduct of the
infringer and thereby promote enforcement of copyright law. " In
upholding a finding of vicarious copyright infringement in
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc., the Second Circuit summarized the holding in the Shapiro
case as follows: "[Elven in the absence of an employer-employee
relationship one may be vicariously liable if he has the right and
own...
153. See Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th
Cir. 1929).
154. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) ("One who hires
an orchestra for a public performance for profit is not relieved from a charge of infringe-
ment merely because he does not select the particular program to be played.").
155. See Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Neb., 58 F. Supp. 523, 533 (D.
Neb. 1944) ("Neither formal intent by the proprietor to infringe, nor his knowledge of the
program actually rendered, is required."), affd, 157 F.2d 744, 749 (8th Cir. 1946); Buck v.
Pettijohn, 34 F. Supp. 968, 968 (E.D. Tenn. 1940) ("The defendant is liable in damages for
the wrongful act of the orchestra, although he may not have authorized or knew that this
composition was played, for the reason that he received benefits to his business by this
orchestral performance."); Buck v. Russo, 25 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D. Mass. 1938) ("It is set-
tled that knowledge of the particular selections to be played is immaterial and intention to
infringe was unnecessary." (citing Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191)).
156. 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
157. Id. at 308; see also Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. NevadaiTIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp.
1314, 1324-26 (D. Mass. 1994) (discussing the policy behind vicarious liability for copy-
right infringement).
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ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct
financial interest in such activities." 58
The Ninth Circuit followed Shapiro in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc."5 9 There, the court held that the complaint stated a
claim for vicarious copyright infringement against the operators
of a swap meet on account of the vendor's sale of counterfeit copy-
righted recordings at the meet. 160 In addition, in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of suc-
cess with respect to a vicarious copyright infringement claim.161
In other cases, courts have found the elements of vicarious
copyright infringement were not satisfied. 162 Other courts have
noted the existence of the theory of vicarious copyright infringe-
ment but decided it was unnecessary to address it.' 63
The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement originated
in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., where the Supreme Court grounded
the doctrine "on principles recognized in every part of the law."' 64
158. 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Shapiro, 316 F.2d 304).
159. 76 F.3d 259, 261-64 (9th Cir. 1996).
160. Id. at 262-64.
161. 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
162. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437-38
(1984) ("This case ... plainly does not fall in [the vicarious copyright infringement] cate-
gory."); Ellison v. Robertson, 375 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding there was no
showing that the defendant received a direct financial benefit from the copyright in-
fringement); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding no basis for vicarious copyright infringement claim);
Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same). The defen-
dant's production of the film did not directly infringe the copyright on the novel, because
the copyright law at the time did not extend to derivative works. See Harper & Bros. v.
Kalem, 169 F. 61, 63 (2d. Cir. 1909) (the series of photographs taken by the defendant...
do not infringe copyrighted book or drama . . . ."). Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, §
1, 26 Stat. 1106 (repealed 1909) with Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075,
1075 (repealed 1976) (adding broad derivative work provision). In contrast, the jobbers'
exhibition of the films constituted direct infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive
right to dramatize the work. 225 L.S. at 61 ("[If the exhibition has or was founded on a
dramatizing of Ben Hur, this copyright was infringed. We are of the opinion that Ben Hur
was dramatized by what was done.").
163. See e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930
n.9 (2005) (finding no need to analyze the vicarious copyright infringement theory because
the Court resolved the case on an inducement theory); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that whether defendant was a vicarious copy-
right infringer was academic because of the likelihood that defendant was liable for con-
tributory copyright infringement).




The defendant produced a film version of the novel, Ben Hur, and
then advertised and sold films to jobbers who infringed the plain-
tiffs copyright by publicly exhibiting the films. 6 ' In holding the
defendant liable for contributory infringement of the copyright,
Justice Holmes explained:
The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the
use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the
most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the one
for which especially they were made. If the defendant did not con-
tribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so except by taking
part in the final act. It is liable on principles recognized in every part
of the law. 1
66
In a subsequent case, Justice Cardozo described the controlling
principle from Kalem as follows: "One who sells a film with the
intention that the buyer shall use it in the infringement of a
copyrighted drama is himself liable as an infringer." 167
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc. in-
volved a claim against an advertising agency and a broadcasting
company that ran ads for hit records at suspiciously low prices. 168
In denying several of the defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment, the district court emphasized the common law origins of
contributory copyright infringement:
Since infringement constitutes a tort, common law concepts of tort
liability are relevant in fixing the scope of the statutory copyright
remedy, and the basic common law doctrine that one who knowingly
participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable
with the prime tortfeasor is applicable in suits arising under the
Copyright Act. 1
69
Approving of Screen Gems, the Second Circuit phrased the
standard for contributory copyright infringement in Gershwin as
follows: "[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, in-
duces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer." 70 The
Ninth Circuit has characterized the quoted language from
Gershwin as the classic statement of the doctrine of contributory
165. Id. at 60-61.
166. Id. at 62-63 (citing Rudd, 131 F. at 732).
167. Underhill v. Schenck, 143 N.E. 773, 776 (N.Y. 1924) (citing Kalem, 222 U.S. 55).
168. See 256 F. Supp. 399, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
169. Id. at 401, 403 (citation omitted).
170. 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citation omitted).
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copyright infringement, 171 and numerous cases have quoted this
language with approval. 1
72
While this language from Gershwin appears to require a con-
tributory infringer to have actual knowledge of the direct in-
fringement, the Gershwin Court muddied the waters by present-
ing Screen Gems as an example of contributory copyright
infringement, and stating that the Screen Gems Court had ruled
that the defendants could be held liable for contributory copyright
infringement upon a showing that they "had knowledge, or reason
to know" of the infringement. 173 As a result of the Gershwin
Court's aside about Screen Gems, the Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have determined that constructive knowledge of direct in-
fringement is sufficient to invoke liability for contributory in-
fringement. '74
The Supreme Court examined the scope of contributory copy-
right infringement in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. "' This case concerned whether Sony was liable for
contributory infringement because it sold video tape recorders to
consumers who used them to infringe the plaintiffs' copyrights. 176
The Court began its analysis by eliminating a number of possible
grounds for imposing liability on Sony. The Court first observed
that it could not impose liability on Sony under Kalem because
the defendant in Kalem sold the infringing work itself to the di-
rect infringer, while Sony supplied a piece of equipment that had
both infringing and noninfringing uses. 7 7 The Court next stated
171. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. See e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004); Cable/Home
Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
173. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; see also Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 405 (stating
that the evidence was sufficient to show that radio stations had either actual or construc-
tive knowledge of direct infringement).
174. Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076 ("We have interpreted the knowledge requirement for
contributory copyright infringement to include both those with actual knowledge and those
who have reason to know of direct infringement." (citing A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001))); Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir.
1987) ("The standard of knowledge is objective: 'Know, or have reason to know.'" (quoting
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162)). For a discussion of the knowledge requirement for contribu-
tory copyright infringement, see Sverker K. Hogberg, Note, The Search for Intent-Based
Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909 (2006).
175. See 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
176. Id. at 419-20.
177. Id. at 436-37.
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that liability could not be imposed for vicarious copyright in-
fringement because Sony had no control over the consumers or
their uses of the video tape recorders.'78 The Court also ruled that
Sony did not intentionally induce its customers to infringe the
plaintiffs' copyrights, and that it did not supply its equipment to
persons it knew were engaging in continuing infringement of the
copyrights. 17 9
After eliminating all these possible grounds for liability, the
Court then framed the issue as whether liability"8 ° should be im-
posed because of Sony's sale of "equipment with constructive
knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment
to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material."" 1 Noting
that there was no precedent in copyright law for imposing liabil-
ity on this ground, the Court then looked to patent law for an
analogy in order to resolve the issue of Sony's liability for con-
tributory infringement. 182 Turning to the staple article of com-
merce doctrine from patent law in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), 183 the Court
decided the doctrine struck an appropriate balance between the
rights of copyright holders and the rights of others to manufac-
ture products.184 The Court, therefore, held that the sale of copy-
ing equipment would not constitute contributory copyright in-
fringement if the equipment was either widely used for
noninfringing purposes or was capable of substantial noninfring-
ing uses.'85 Finding that the video tape recorders had substantial
178. Id. at 437-38.
179. Id. at 439 n.19.
180. While the Court referred to the imposition of "vicarious liability," it is evident that
it was using this term in a general sense, rather than to refer to vicarious copyright in-
fringement as exemplified by the dance hall cases. The Court had already eliminated vi-
carious copyright infringement as a basis for Sony's liability. In addition, there is no re-
quirement of either constructive or general knowledge for vicarious copyright infringe-
ment. See Hogberg, supra note 174, at 921 n.72 ("Although the Court referred to 'vicarious
liability,' this term seems to be a synonym for secondary liability in general.").
181. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the
Court characterized the issue in Sony as whether liability should have been imposed "on a
theory of contributory infringement arising from its sale of VCRs to consumers with
knowledge that some would use them to infringe." 545 U.S. 913, 931 (2005). The issue
framed in Sony, however, was actually whether liability should be imposed on account of
Sony's constructive knowledge of direct infringement, rather than Sony's actual knowledge
that some of its customers would engage in direct infringement.
182. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
183. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
184. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
185. Id.
20081
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
noninfringing uses, the Court concluded that Sony's sales did not
constitute contributory infringement. 186
Instead of looking to the patent statute for an analogy, the
Sony Court should have relied on the general principles of vicari-
ous liability it referenced earlier in the opinion."8 7 Congress en-
acted the patent statute in 1952 to rescue the doctrine of con-
tributory infringement from being severely undermined by the
doctrine of patent misuse as a result of a line of Supreme Court
opinions in which the Court had ruled that a patentee's assertion
of contributory infringement constituted patent misuse.188 This
line of Supreme Court opinions had no connection with copyright
law, and there is no evidence of any legislative intent for applying
the. patent statute to copyright law. The only explanation the
Court gave for referring to patent law was what it called "the his-
toric kinship between patent law and copyright law."8 9 The kin-
ship between the law of indirect copyright infringement and gen-
eral tort law principles was closer than with patent law, however,
because the law of indirect infringement of copyright derived
from general tort law principles. Accordingly, general tort law
principles should have been controlling in Sony. Had the Court
relied on general tort law instead of the patent statute, it would
have reached the same result as it ultimately concluded there
was no contributory infringement under either general tort law or
the patent statute. 190
It is important to recognize the limits of the Sony decision. The
Court could certainly have inferred Sony's actual knowledge of its
customer's copyright infringement if the equipment it sold was
not capable of any substantial noninfringing uses. On the other
hand, the Court could not necessarily have inferred actual knowl-
edge if the equipment did have any substantial noninfringing
uses. Because it decided that the equipment did have substantial
noninfringing uses, the Court was unwilling to impose liability on
186. Id. at 456 ("The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Sony's sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute contributory in-
fringement of respondents' copyrights.").
187. See id. at 435.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 88-96.
189. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439. For a vigorous criticism of the Court's reliance on patent
law in Sony and Grokster, see David Nimmer & Peter Menell, Copyright's "Staple Article
of Commerce" Doctrine: Patently Misguided-The 35th Annual Brace Lecture, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y,365 (2006).
190. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
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Sony in the absence of any proof that Sony either was in a posi-
tion to control copyright infringement by its customers,19' inten-
tionally induced copyright infringement by its customers, 192 or
supplied its equipment to customers with actual knowledge that
they were engaging in copyright infringement. 1
93
The Court addressed inducing infringement in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.'94 In Grokster, the Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's decision that the defendants could not
be liable for contributory copyright infringement for their distri-
bution of products that were capable of substantial noninfringing
uses unless the defendants had actual knowledge of specific in-
stances of infringement and failed to act on that knowledge.' 95
The Court decided that Sony's limitation on liability for contribu-
tory copyright infringement arising from the sale of products with
substantial noninfringing uses did not preclude liability for induc-
ing infringement.'96 Again turning to patent law for an anal-
ogy,' the Court held: "[O]ne who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster in-
fringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties."'98 The Court continued:
[Mlere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses
would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor
would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering
customers technical support or product updates, support liability in
themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on pur-
poseful, culpable expression and conduct .... 199
The Court also explained:
It is not only that encouraging a particular consumer to infringe a
copyright can give rise to secondary liability for the infringement
that results. Inducement liability goes beyond that, and the distribu-
tion of a product can itself give rise to liability where evidence shows
191. See id. at 437-38.
192. Id. at 439 n.19.
193. Id.
194. See 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
195. Id. at 927, 941.
196. Id. at 935.
197. Id. at 936 ("For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of pat-
ent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensi-
ble one for copyright.").
198. Id. at 936-37.
199. Id. at 937.
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that the distributor intended and encouraged the product to be used
to infringe. In such a case, the culpable act is not merely the encour-
agement of infringement but also the distribution of the tool in-
tended for infringing use. 200
The Court then reviewed the evidence in the summary judgment
record. It decided that the evidence showed the defendants'
unlawful objective was unmistakable, and that there was sub-
stantial evidence of all the elements required for inducing in-
fringement.0 1
The case law on contributory copyright infringement and in-
ducing infringement is similar to the general tort law principles
of aiding and abetting liability and inducing tortious conduct
found in Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 876(b) and 877(a).
The Gershwin Court blurred the distinction between aiding and
abetting liability and inducing tortious conduct, but the Supreme
Court appeared to recognize a distinction between these two
grounds for liability in both Sony and Grokster. °2 The Supreme
Court has not addressed, however, whether actual or constructive
knowledge is required for either contributory copyright infringe-
ment or inducing infringement. While the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have ruled that constructive knowledge is sufficient,2 3
these courts did not distinguish between contributory copyright
infringement and inducing infringement. Under Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 876(b), actual knowledge should be re-
quired for contributory infringement, and under section 877(a),
constructive knowledge should be sufficient for inducing in-
fringement.
The Supreme Court also has not addressed whether Sony's
limitation on liability for contributory copyright infringement
arising from the sale of a product having substantial noninfring-
ing uses should apply where the seller has actual knowledge that
particular customers are using the product for infringement. As
200. Id. at 940 n.13.
201. See id. at 940.
202. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940 n.13 (noting that inducing infringement goes beyond
encouraging a particular consumer to infringe a copyright); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 439 n.19 (finding that Sony neither intentionally
induced infringement nor supplied products to individuals that it knew were continuing
infringement).
203. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); Fonovisa, Inc. v.




noted previously, this limitation should apply in patent law be-
cause of the legislative intent to restrict liability for contributory
patent infringement to the sale of products with no substantial
noninfringing uses.2 °4 It is less clear whether this limitation
should apply in copyright law, however, because of the absence of
a similar legislative intent. Moreover, the Court declared in
Grokster that "the [Sony] case was never meant to foreclose rules
of fault-based liability derived from the common law."20 5 Thus, it
may be that a court should impose liability for contributory copy-
right infringement under the common law aider and abettor prin-
ciples in Restatement (Second) of Torts in section 876(b) on a
seller of products that have substantial noninfringing uses. For a
court to impose liability, there would have to be evidence of both
the seller's providing substantial assistance to buyers to infringe
copyrights, and the seller's actual knowledge that the buyers
were using the products to infringe the copyrights.
While general tort law supports imposition of liability for con-
tributory copyright infringement and inducing infringement, it
does not appear to support liability for vicarious copyright in-
fringement. Consequently, there appears to be a need to re-
examine the doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement. Re-
statement (Second) of Agency section 219 provides that employers
are liable for the torts of their employees committed in the course
of their employment, 206 but Restatement (Second) of Torts section
409 provides that employers are generally not liable for torts
committed by independent contractors. The common law's dis-
tinction between employees and independent contractors is made
on account of the difference in employers' power to control the
manner in which work is done by employees and independent
contractors. Liability for vicarious copyright infringement arises
out of the defendant's control over the direct infringer and the de-
fendant's direct financial interest in the infringing activities. 207 It
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 877(a) (1979).
205. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-35.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) ("A master is subject to liabil-
ity for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.").
207. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("[Elven in the absence of an employer-employee relationship one may be vi-
cariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also
has a direct financial interest in such activities." (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963))).
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seems that if a defendant truly exercises control over a direct in-
fringer's activities, it should be treated as an employer and liable
under Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219. On the other
hand, if the defendant's degree of control is not sufficient for the
defendant to be liable as an employer, it should not be liable for
vicarious copyright infringement when it would not be subject to
liability for other torts the direct infringer may commit. 208
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c) offers an alterna-
tive ground that might have been used in the cases imposing li-
ability on dance hall proprietors for copyright infringement by or-
chestras they hired. Section 877(c) provides for liability if a
defendant permits another person to use the defendant's prem-
ises or instrumentalities, but it includes a requirement that the
defendant must have actual or constructive knowledge that the
other person is acting or will act tortiously. 209 Treating dance hall
proprietors like landlords, rather than employers, would not have
precluded their being held liable for copyright infringement by
the orchestras, but it would have limited the proprietors' liability
to circumstances where they had actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the copyright infringement. 210
208. Cf. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 488 n.29 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("Courts have premised liability in these cases on the notion that the defen-
dant had the ability to supervise or control the infringing activities. This notion, however,
is to some extent fictional; the defendant cannot escape liability by instructing the per-
formers not to play copyrighted music, or even by inserting a provision to that effect into
the performers' contract." (citations omitted)).
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) (1979) ("For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he ... (c) permits
the other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason
to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously....").
210. See id. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(d) provides for liability if a de-
fendant "controls, or has a duty to use care to control, the conduct of the other, who is
likely to do harm if not controlled, and fails to exercise care in the control . . . ." Id. §
877(d). The Comment to this provision indicates that it is directed to cases involving in-
sane or dangerous persons; accordingly, it would not be applicable to indirect infringe-
ment. Id. § 877(d) cmt. e.
Another possible basis for liability might be the following exception in Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts section 427B to the general rule of non-liability of employers for the torts of
independent contractors:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer
knows or has reason to know to be likely to involve a trespass upon the land
of another or the creation of a public or a private nuisance, is subject to liabil-
ity for harm resulting to others from such trespass or nuisance.
Id. § 427B. Although section 427B is limited to trespass and nuisance, it would not be un-
reasonable to extend it to copyright infringement; then, it might provide support for the
results in the dance hall cases, if the proprietors had reason to know that copyright in-
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The doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement has begun to
metastasize from its origins in the dance hall cases to cases in-
volving computer networks. 211 As a consequence, Congress has
enacted safe harbor provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 512 to protect Inter-
net service providers and others from open-ended liability for
copyright infringement by users of their networks.212 For exam-
ple, § 512(c) exempts an Internet service provider from liability
for copyright infringement arising out of the storage of material
on the service provider's system if the service provider lacks ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of copyright infringement or if the
provider acts expeditiously to remove the material after obtaining
knowledge of the copyright infringement.2 3 Unfortunately, this
provision may not be completely effective in protecting operators
of computer networks who lack actual or constructive knowledge
of infringing activity from liability for vicarious copyright in-
fringement.21 4
Instead of allowing the anomalous doctrine of vicarious copy-
right infringement to expand beyond its origins in the dance hall
cases and then rely on § 512 to protect computer network opera-
fringement by the orchestras was likely.
211. See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Aim-
ster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d
828, 856-58 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire & Equip. Distribs.,
983 F. Supp. 1167, 1178-79 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Com-
mc'n. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Mark A. Lemley & R. An-
thony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1367 (2004) ("In recent years, the doctrine has far outgrown the em-
ployment and independent contracting contexts, and the financial interest that a defen-
dant must have in a third party's infringing activities in order to be held liable has become
more attenuated."); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copy-
right Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833,
1843-72 (2000); Kelly Tickle, Comment, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin
Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80
IOWA L. REV. 391 (1995).
212. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19-20 (1998); Lemley & Reese, supra note 211, at
1369; Jason Kessler, Note, Correcting the Standard for Contributory Trademark Liability
Over the Internet, 39 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 375, 396-97 (2006).
213. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).
214. Section 512(c) applies only to liability arising from the storage of infringing mate-
rial on a computer network, and some network owners may become liable for vicarious
copyright infringement on account of the transmission of infringing material. See Lemley
& Reese, supra note 211, at 1369-71. In addition, § 512(c) provides that the safe harbor
does not apply if the service provider receives a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity. See Kessler, supra note 212, at 396-97. But see Hendrickson v.
eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that eBay came within
the safe harbor provision in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
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tors from liability for infringement, courts should restrict the doc-
trine of vicarious copyright infringement to the dance hall cas-
es 211 (and in the Ninth Circuit, to swap meets21 and Napster217).
As the Supreme Court ruled in Meyer v. Holley, traditional vicari-
ous liability rules should apply in the absence of contrary legisla-
tive intent.21 Accordingly, in place of vicarious copyright in-
fringement, courts should use the general tort law principles in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c) to impose liability on
computer network operators for copyright infringement by users
of their networks only if the computer network operators have ei-
ther actual or constructive knowledge of the copyright infringe-
ment.219
V. INDIRECT TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Until recently, claims for indirect infringement of trademarks
typically arose in the context of the sale of unlabeled products to
retailers who affixed counterfeit trademarks on the products be-
fore selling them to consumers. Courts have imposed liability un-
der the heading of contributory trademark infringement, and the
standard for contributory trademark infringement is similar to
that set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 876(b) and
877(a).
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement appears
to have originated in Socitd Anonyme de la Distillerie de la Li-
215. See Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 184, 229-30 (2006) ("Future courts should . . . restrict the application of vicarious
copyright liability, perhaps to the general contours of respondeat superior, in order to
avoid contradicting Grokster's reliance on fault."). Limiting vicarious liability for copyright
infringement to the dance hall cases would not conflict with the congressional intent ex-
pressed in H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159-60 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5775-76, because the House Judiciary Committee stated only that it had decided not
to change the existing law concerning the public performance right, and it did not indicate
the existing law should be extended. See supra text accompanying note 62.
216. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-64 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for vicarious copyright infringement against the
operator of a swap meet).
217. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (stat-
ing the plaintiff showed a likelihood of success for vicarious copyright infringement claim
against Napster).
218. See 537 U.S. 280, 285-87 (2003).
219. See Yen, supra note 215, at 1892 ("Whatever the wrongs embodied in copyright
infringement, they are not serious enough to warrant ISP liability unless knowing assis-
tance in that infringement is present.").
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quer Benedictine de L'Abbaye de Fecamp v. Western Distilling
Co.,220 and Hostetter Co. v. Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling Co. 221
After the defendant in Socigtg Anonyme was enjoined from selling
Benedictine liquor in bottles that violated the plaintiffs trade-
mark, the defendant sold its stock of Benedictine liquor in bulk to
a third party along with its bottles, labels, and wrappers.222 It no-
tified its customers that the third party would be filling their or-
ders in the future. 223 The court found the defendant guilty of con-
tempt, holding: "A party who, while resting under an injunction
restraining him from doing a given act, counsels, advises, and
procures another to do the act, violates the letter as well as the
spirit of the restraining order. 2 4
In Hostetter, the defendant sold to its customers, in bulk, a
counterfeit bitters drink that resembled the plaintiffs trade-
marked Hostetter's Bitters.225 It advised the customers to refill
bottles that originally contained Hostetter's Bitters with the de-
fendant's counterfeit bitters drink and then put them on the
market as genuine Hostetter's Bitters.22 6 Normally, a claim for
trademark infringement requires proof of the likelihood of confu-
sion from the use of a trademark in commerce. 27 The defendant's
customers were aware that the defendant was the source of the
counterfeit bitters drink, and so there was no likelihood that the
defendant's customers were confused by the sale.22 Relying on
Socidtg Anonyme, however, the Hostetter Court issued an injunc-
tion, holding: "[A] person who counsels and advises another to
perpetrate a fraud, and who also furnishes him the means of con-
summating the same, is himself a wrong-doer, and, as such, is li-
able for the injury inflicted." 29
220. 42 F. 96 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1890).
221. 46 F. 188 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1891).
222. Socidtd Anonyme, 42 F. at 96-97.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 97.
225. Hostetter, 46 F. at 188.
226. Id. For a brief history of Hostetter's Bitters and the drink's distinctive bottles, see
Frank Baxter, A Century of Hostetter's Bitters or .. .It Pays to Advertise, BOTTLES &
EXTRAS available at http://www.fohbc.com/images/hostetters.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2007).
227. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2007) (setting forth a cause of action for using other's
registered marks); id. § 1125(a)(1) (setting forth a cause of action for false designation of
origin).
228. See Hostetter, 46 F. at 188.
229. Id. at 189; see also Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 F. 720, 722-23 (6th Cir.
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William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. involved a similar
scenario. 230 The plaintiff manufactured a pharmaceutical prepa-
ration under the name Coco-Quinine, and the defendant manu-
factured a substantially similar preparation, which it sold to
druggists under the name of Quin-Coco at lower prices than the
plaintiffs preparation. 231 The druggists, in turn, substituted the
defendant's Quin-Coco for the plaintiffs Coco-Quinine in dispens-
ing it to consumers. 32 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
had established a claim for unfair competition:
That no deception was practiced on the retail dealers, and that they
knew exactly what they were getting is of no consequence. The
wrong was in designedly enabling the dealers to palm off the prepa-
ration as that of the respondent. One who induces another to commit
a fraud and furnishes the means of consummating it is equally guilty
and liable for the injury. 233
The Restatement of Torts had three sections dealing with con-
tributory trademark infringement. Section 713 was entitled "In-
ducing Fraudulent Marketing," and its black letter provided:
"One fraudulently markets his goods as those of another if,
though making no misrepresentation himself, he intentionally
induces his purchasers so to market them."2 34 The Illustration for
this section was based on the facts in William R. Warner case.235
1912) ("[Iun a suit for unfair competition, it is not necessary to show that the immediate
purchasers were deceived as to the origin of the goods; but even if they thoroughly under-
stand that they are buying the counterfeit, and not the genuine, the manufacturer of the
counterfeit will be enjoined from selling it to dealers with the purpose and expectation
that it shall be used by the dealers to deceive the consumer."); N.K. Fairbank Co. v. R.W.
Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F. 869, 878 (2d Cir. 1896) ("It has been said more than once in this case
that the manufacturer ought not to be held liable for the fraud of the ultimate seller; that
is, the shopkeeper or the shopkeeper's assistant. But that is not the true view of the case.
The question is whether the defendants have or have not knowingly put into the hands of
the retail dealers the means of deceiving the ultimate purchasers." (quoting Lever v.
Goodwin, (1897) 36 Ch. 1, 3)); Enoch Morgan's Sons Co. v. Whittier-Coburn Co., 118 F.
657, 662 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902) ("We have, then, the case of a manufacturer who is careful
always to sell its goods as its own, but who puts them up in a style of package so similar to
that used by one of its competitors, earlier in the market, that unscrupulous dealers, who
purchase from the manufacturer in order to sell at retail to consumers, are enabled to de-
lude a large number of such retail purchasers by palming off upon them the goods of the
manufacturer as those of its competitor. That this is unfair competition seems apparent,
both on reason and authority." (quoting N.K. Fairbank Co. v. R.W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F.
869, 878 (2d Cir. 1896)).
230. See 265 U.S. 526 (1924).
231. Id. at 527-30.
232. Id. at 530.
233. Id. at 530-31 (citations omitted).
234. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 713 (1938).
235. See id. illus. 1.
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Section 738 was entitled "Inducing or Aiding One's Purchasers to
Infringe on Resale," and its black letter provided: "One who in-
duces or aids persons who purchase goods directly or indirectly
from him to market them in such a manner as to infringe an-
other's trade-mark or trade name infringes it himself."236 Lastly,
section 739 was entitled "Contributory Infringement," and its
black letter provided: "One who supplies third persons with la-
bels, stamps, wrappers or containers bearing designations identi-
cal with or confusingly similar to another's trade-mark or trade
name is subject to liability under the same conditions as the third
persons who use the labels, stamps, wrappers or containers."237
The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts deleted the
chapter entitled "Confusion of Source," in which these sections
were included, as well as two other chapters dealing with unfair
trade practices. The American Law Institute decided that while
the rules relating to liability for harm from unfair trade practices
had developed from tort law principles, the influence of tort law
had decreased in the fields of unfair competition and trade regu-
lation; therefore these fields no longer belonged in the Restate-
ment of Torts.23" The Institute added that if it was decided later
that a restatement was needed for these fields, it would prepare
separate restatements on the particular subjects.2 39 In 1995, the
Institute adopted the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion.24 °
The next major development in the law of contributory trade-
mark infringement was the Supreme Court's decision in Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 241 There, the plaintiff
manufactured and sold a patented prescription drug in colored
capsules under a registered trademark.242 After the patent ex-
pired, generic drug manufacturers began manufacturing and sell-
ing the drug in capsules that copied the appearance of plaintiffs
capsules.243 The plaintiff alleged that some pharmacists had dis-
pensed generic drugs they had mislabeled with the plaintiffs reg-
236. Id. § 738.
237. Id. § 739.
238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS div. 9, introductory note, at 1 (1979).
239. Id. at 2.
240. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
241. See 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
242. Id. at 846.
243. Id. at 847.
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istered trademark, and that the generic drug manufacturers had
contributed to the mislabeling by their use of look-alike cap-
sules.244 The trial court ruled that the plaintiff had not presented
sufficient evidence to establish a claim for contributory trade-
mark infringement, and the Supreme Court affirmed that judg-
ment by reversing the Second Circuit's contrary decision. 245 The
Court held:
[11f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to in-
fringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark in-
fringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially [sic]
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.
246
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 27 sets out
the standard for contributory trademark infringement by manu-
facturers and distributors as follows:
One who markets goods or services to a third person who further
markets the goods or services in a manner that subjects the third
person to liability to another for infringement under the rule stated
in section 20 is subject to liability to that other for contributory in-
fringement if: (a) the actor intentionally induces the third person to
engage in the infringing conduct; or (b) the actor fails to take reason-
able precautions against the occurrence of the third person's infring-
ing conduct in circumstances in which the infringing conduct can be
reasonably anticipated. 247
This provision is similar to the standard from Inwood, but it
differs from Inwood in one respect. Under Inwood, liability is im-
posed if a manufacturer or distributor continues to supply goods
with actual or constructive knowledge that the purchaser is en-
gaging in trademark infringement.24s In contrast, Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition section 27 provides that a manufac-
turer or distributor may avoid liability by taking reasonable pre-
cautions against the purchaser's trademark infringement if the
purchaser's trademark infringement could be reasonably antici-
pated.24 9 The Reporter's Note explains that a manufacturer would
not be required to stop supplying goods to a particular purchaser
who had engaged in trademark infringement if the manufacturer
244. Id. at 851.
245. Id. at 851, 858-59.
246. Id. at 854.
247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995).
248. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854.
249. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27(b) (1995).
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reasonably believed that less drastic precautions would deter fu-
ture infringement.25 °
In addition, Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section
26 provides for contributory trademark infringement by printers,
publishers, and other suppliers as follows:
(1) One who, on behalf of a third person, reproduces or imitates
the trademark, trade name, collective mark, or certification mark of
another on goods, labels, packaging, advertisements, or other mate-
rials that are used by the third person in a manner that subjects the
third person to liability to the other for infringement under the rule
stated in section 20 is subject to liability to that other for contribu-
tory infringement.
(2) If an actor subject to contributory liability under the rule
stated in Subsection (1) acted without knowledge that the reproduc-
tion or imitation was intended by the third person to confuse or de-
ceive, the actor is subject only to appropriate injunctive relief. 251
The Seventh Circuit analyzed contributory trademark in-
fringement by an owner and operator of flea markets in Hard
Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.2" 2 The
court referred to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c),
which imposes tort liability for permitting another person to act
upon the defendant's premises or with the defendant's instru-
mentalities with actual or constructive knowledge that the other
person is acting or will act tortiously.2 53 The court noted that sec-
tion 877(c) imposed the same duty on landlords and licensors as
the Supreme Court had imposed on manufacturers and distribu-
tors in Inwood.254 Accordingly, the court held that the Inwood
standard applied to contributory trademark infringement by the
owner and operator of flea markets, and that the defendant must
have actual or constructive knowledge of trademark infringement
by vendors at its flea markets to be liable for contributory trade-
mark infringement. 255 The court declined to apply the doctrine of
vicarious liability for contributory copyright infringement that
250. Id. § 27 reporter's note cmt. d.
251. Id. § 26.
252. See 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) (1979) ("For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he .. .(c) permits
the other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason
to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously...
254. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149.
255. Id.
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had developed out of the dance hall cases.2 56 The court noted that
the Supreme Court had stated in Sony that there were funda-
mental differences between copyright and trademark law, and
that the standard for contributory infringement in trademark law
was narrower than for copyright law.257
The Ninth Circuit approved Hard Rock in Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., which involved contributory trademark in-
fringement by an operator of a swap meet. 25' The Fonovisa court
cited Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c), and it applied
the Inwood standard to the swap meet.259
The Ninth Circuit took a strange turn, however, in Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.2'0 The Lockheed case was
brought against Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), the registrar of
Internet domain names, for contributory trademark infringement
because NSI registered domain names to third parties that in-
fringed or diluted Lockheed's service mark for "Skunk Works."2 1
The court distinguished Inwood on the grounds that Inwood dealt
with a product being supplied by its manufacturer, while NSI
supplied a service that was akin to the routing of mail by the
United States Postal Service.262 The court then turned to the
Hard Rock and Fonovisa decisions for precedential guidance,
stating that those decisions instructed that in contributory in-
fringement cases outside the Inwood context of manufacturers
supplying products, courts should "consider the extent of control
exercised by the defendant over the third party's means of in-
fringement." 263 The court explained: "Direct control and monitor-
ing of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the
plaintiffs mark permits the expansion of Inwood Lab's 'supplies a
product' requirement for contributory infringement. ' 264 The court
256. Id. at 1150.
257. Id. at 1150 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439
n.19 (1984)).
258. See 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996).
259. Id. at 265.
260. See 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
261. Id. at 983.
262. Id. at 984-85. It is not clear why the distinction between products and services
should be significant for purposes of contributory trademark infringement. Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition section 27 applies the Inwood standard to marketers of e&
ther goods or services. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995).




then went on to affirm summary judgment in favor of NSI on the
grounds that NSI did not exercise sufficient direct control and
monitoring to warrant an extension of Inwood to the supplier of a
service.265
The Lockheed Court's interpretation of Hard Rock and Fono-
visa is incorrect. 266 Both cases expressly relied on Inwood and the
provision in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c) that im-
poses tort liability for permitting another person to act upon the
defendant's premises or with the defendant's instrumentalities
with actual or constructive knowledge that the other person is
acting or will act tortiously.267 Neither Inwood nor section 877(c)
requires direct control and monitoring for liability for contribu-
tory trademark infringement. In addition, the Hard Rock Court
rejected application of the vicarious liability doctrine from copy-
right law, which was the source of the control requirement, which
was the source of the control requirement. 26" The Lockheed
Court's introduction of a control requirement adds confusion to
the analysis of contributory infringement, particularly for com-
puter network operators, because it is not clear what degree of
control is required. In addition, the degree of control with respect
to computer networks is generally technology-dependent and,
therefore, a control standard may require a complicated analysis
of the underlying technology. Furthermore, a control requirement
provides an incentive for a computer network operator to limit its
monitoring and control of the network to avoid exposure to liabil-
ity. Finally, a control requirement directs attention away from a
defendant's intent and knowledge, which generally have been
critical for finding the defendant liable for a tort committed by
another. Although the Lockheed decision was not supported by
precedent and appears unwise, a number of courts have followed
it.
2 69
265. Id. at 986.
266. The Lockheed decision is criticized in Kessler, supra note 212, at 387 ("This 'direct
control and monitoring' rule that the court derived from Hard Rock and Fonovisa is com-
pletely misplaced. Extent of control is not a factor in the Hard Rock test and should not
have been considered by the court in Lockheed." (citation omitted)).
267. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1996);
Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (7th
Cir. 1992).
268. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1151.
269. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because it did not allege facts sufficient to
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Except for the Lockheed decision and the cases following it, the
case law on contributory trademark infringement tracks fairly
closely the general tort law principles of aiding and abetting li-
ability and inducing tortious conduct found in Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts sections 876(b) and 877(a). The first part of the In-
wood standard, which imposes liability on "a manufacturer or
distributor [who] intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark,"27 ° is substantially the same as the provision for in-
ducing tortious conduct in Restatement (Second) of Torts section
877(a). The main difference is that the Inwood standard does not
expressly include a requirement for the defendant to have actual
or constructive knowledge that the other person's conduct is in-
fringing. Courts should probably read the requirement of actual
or constructive knowledge into the Inwood standard to avoid im-
posing liability on a defendant who either had a good-faith belief
the other person was not infringing the trademark, or else had no
reason to know that the other person was infringing the trade-
mark.
The second part of the Inwood standard, which imposes liabil-
ity on "a manufacturer or distributor [that] . . . continues to sup-
ply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is en-
gaging in trademark infringement,"2 71 is analogous to the aiding
and abetting liability found in Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 876(b). Inwood imposes liability if the defendant has either
actual or constructive knowledge of trademark infringement,
however, while section 876(b) provides for liability only if the de-
show direct control and monitoring); Habeeba's Dance of the Arts, Ltd. v. Knoblauch, 430
F. Supp. 2d 709, 714-15 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (holding that the complaint stated a claim for
contributory trademark infringement against YMCA because, facts alleged in the com-
plaint supported the inference that YMCA had enough control over the direct infringer to
have prevented infringement); SB Designs v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 338 F. Supp. 2d 904, 914
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (granting summary judgment on a contributory trademark infringement
claim because there was no evidence that defendant controlled or monitored the website
that allegedly infringed plaintiff's trademark); GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700,
705 (E.D. Va. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss a claim for contributory trademark in-
fringement because the complaint alleged that the Internet search engine operator moni-
tored and controlled infringing third-party advertisements); Size, Inc. v. Network Solu-
tions, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 568, 572-73 (E.D. Va. 2003) (dismissing a contributory
trademark infringement action against NSI because NSI did not supply a product and did
not monitor or control use of domain names); Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 688-91 (D. Md. 2001) (affirming summary judgment because
defendant did not directly monitor and control activities of an infringing website).




fendant has actual knowledge of the infringement.272 The distinc-
tion between actual and constructive knowledge is probably not
significant in the context of contributory trademark infringement
as a practical matter because in most cases a defendant that has
reason to know a customer is infringing a trademark will also
have actual knowledge of the infringement.
The provisions for contributory trademark infringement in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition273 are also very similar
to the general tort law principles of aiding and abetting liability
and inducing tortious conduct found in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 27
was based on Inwood, and because Inwood conforms to the gen-
eral tort law principles of aiding and abetting liability and induc-
ing tortious conduct found in Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec-
tion 27 does so as well. As noted previously, the main difference
between section 27 and Inwood is that Inwood imposes liability
on a manufacturer or distributor that continues to supply goods
to a customer it knows or has reason to know is infringing, while
section 27 imposes liability only if the manufacturer or distribu-
tor fails to take reasonable precautions against the infringement
in circumstances where it can reasonably anticipate infringe-
ment.2 74 Both formulations are broader than the requirement of
actual knowledge in the provision for aiding and abetting liability
in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b),2 75 but the differ-
ences are probably not significant as a practical matter because
in most cases a manufacturer could reasonably anticipate its cus-
tomers' infringement if it has actual knowledge of the infringe-
ment.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 26 provides
for contributory infringement by printers, publishers, and other
suppliers who reproduce or imitate a trademark on labels, pack-
aging, or advertisements that their customer uses for trademark
infringement.276 This provision resembles the one for aiding and
abetting liability in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b)
because a supplier of labels, packaging, or advertisements gener-
272. Compare id. at 854-55, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
273. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 26, 27 (1995).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 248-50.
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
276. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26 cmt. a (1995).
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ally would be providing substantial assistance to the trademark
infringement. In addition, the provision in Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition section 26(2) that limits the liability to in-
junctive relief if the printer, publisher, or other supplier that
acted without knowledge of the customer's intention to reproduce
or imitate the trademark to confuse or deceive essentially im-
poses an actual knowledge requirement.277 By the time a court is-
sues an injunction, the defendant will have actual knowledge of
the infringement, and a defendant will not be subject to a judg-
ment for damages unless he had actual knowledge.
Hard Rock and Fonovisa, dealing with the liability of operators
of flea markets and swap meets for contributory trademark in-
fringement, are consistent with the general tort law principles in
Restatement (Second) of Torts. This is not surprising because the
opinions in both cases relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 877(c), which provides for liability if a defendant permits an-
other person to use the defendant's premises or instrumentalities
with actual or constructive knowledge that the other person is
acting or will act tortiously.2 7
Section 877(c) also could be applied to impose liability on a
computer network operator that permits persons to use the net-
work if the operator had actual or constructive knowledge of
trademark infringement by users of the network. Unfortunately,
the Ninth Circuit in Lockheed ignored section 877(c) and the gen-
eral tort principles on which it was based when it imposed a con-
trol requirement,2 79 instead of a requirement of actual or con-
structive knowledge of infringement for contributory trademark
infringement by computer network operators. Hopefully, other
courts will not follow Lockheed.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Sony, vicarious liability
is not limited to intellectual property law, but applies "in virtu-
277. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26(2) (1995).
278. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 76 F.3d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1996);
Hard Rock Cafd Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv's Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (7th
Cir. 1992).




ally all areas of the law."28" Restatement (Second) of Torts sections
876 and 877 encapsulate general tort law principles that the
common law has developed to govern liability for the conduct of
another person. Section 876(b) imposes liability on an aider and
abettor who gives substantial assistance or encouragement to an-
other to commit a tort with actual knowledge that the other per-
son's conduct is tortious.281 Section 877(a) imposes liability on a
person who orders or induces another person's tortious conduct
with either actual or constructive knowledge that the conduct is
tortious.282 Section 877(c) imposes liability on a person who per-
mits another person to act upon his premises or with his instru-
mentalities with either actual or constructive knowledge that the
other person is committing or will commit a tort.283 These provi-
sions provide the legal context into which the law of indirect in-
fringement of intellectual property should fit.
Although the law of indirect infringement derives from com-
mon law principles, it has developed separately in the areas of
patent, copyright, and trademark law and independently of gen-
eral tort law. Nevertheless, the law of indirect infringement con-
forms to general tort law for the most part. Even though it is gov-
erned by statute, the law of indirect infringement of patents
probably conforms most closely to general tort law. The only sig-
nificant difference between indirect infringement of patents and
general tort law is the limitation of contributory infringement in
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) to the sale of products having no substantial
noninfringing uses. In contrast, Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 876(b) would extend aider and abettor liability to the giv-
ing of substantial assistance to patent infringement with actual
knowledge of the infringement.
There is a major discrepancy between indirect infringement in
copyright law and the general tort law, however. This is the doc-
trine of vicarious liability for copyright infringement that devel-
oped in the dance hall cases and was extended in Napster to a
computer network operator.284 Vicarious liability for copyright in-
fringement was never sound in principle, but the imposition of li-
280. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
281. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
282. See id. § 877(a).
283. See id. § 877(c).
284. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
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ability on the dance hall proprietors for copyright infringement
committed by orchestras was relatively benign because there
were only a limited number of such cases and they had little sig-
nificance. The extension of vicarious liability to computer network
operators is more serious, and it has generated undesirable un-
certainty in an important part of the world's economy. The lack of
precedent in general tort law for vicarious liability without either
actual or constructive knowledge of the tortious conduct provides
additional support for limiting or overruling the troublesome doc-
trine of vicarious liability for copyright infringement.
It would be anomalous if a defendant were to be indirectly li-
able for another person's direct infringement of intellectual prop-
erty rights, but not for other torts the other person committed, or
vice versa. Consequently, the law of indirect infringement should
be interpreted so that it is consistent with general tort law when-
ever possible.
